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SUMMARY
This article focuses on shareholder supremacy and exclusivity
derived from a view of the company as a nexus of contracts. The
nexus of contracts theory is the dominant theory within English
company law. It defines the company as a contract between private
individuals. The shareholders and the company are recognized as
the only parties to that contract. While corporate membership is
reserved exclusively for shareholders, the rest of the stakeholders are
viewed as external to the company. The article will question the
theoretical and doctrinal validity of shareholder supremacy and
exclusivity within this context. It argues that while the nexus of
contracts theory promotes shareholder exclusivity in a rather dog-
matic manner, not only the law but also the courts have limited the
rights of shareholders to a significant extent. The article does not
place into doubt the importance of shareholders within the corporate
context; after all the shareholders are the capital providers of the
company. It does however criticize the current status quo in English
company law where theoretically the shareholders are sitting on the
corporate throne in a company which includes no one else but them,
but in practice their supremacy is challenged by the courts to such a
degree that it is difficult to exercise even the rights stemming from
their shares and to have access to effective remedies against manage-
rial abuse. The article will therefore underline the controversies
inherent in the nexus of contracts theory. It will shed light on the
distorted application of the theory within English company law. It
argues that the theory should be reformed to adjust to the new
reality. On the one hand, it should certainly protect the rights of
shareholders stemming from their shares and it should allow for
effective shareholder protection against mismanagement. On the
other hand, the theory should adopt a more inclusive definition of
the company that will not leave the stakeholders off its context.
Especially those stakeholders who clearly have a contractual rela-
tionship with the company should be factored into corporate
governance.
Therefore, the article will argue against the doctrinal
dominance of shareholder exclusivity and supremacy by arguing
that they nowadays flow from a flawed interpretation of the
nexus of contracts theory. The article will focus on shareholder
protection; it will examine section 994 of the Companies Act
2006, which provides for one of the main remedies against
directorial abuse. The jurisprudence of the courts embodies a
clear mismatch between theory and practice. Absolute share-
holder supremacy should have entailed an enhanced level of
protection to match the status of shareholders as the only
members of the company. After all, the nexus of contracts theory
defines the interests of the company as the interests of the
shareholders. Yet, the judicial stance on this matter proves
that the courts have actually curtailed the protection granted to
shareholders by the Companies Act 2006; this clearly testifies
to the deeply problematic nature of shareholder supremacy
within the context of the nexus of contracts theory. The article
will therefore argue that the dominant views in theory, academia
and law, which continue to recognize a notion of absolute
shareholder supremacy and exclusivity, flow mostly from
ideology rather than reality. Ideological dogmatism has resulted
in a very narrow, and in many ways distorted, definition of the
company; one which left only the shareholders within its con-
text albeit and paradoxically with a limited set of rights to
control the management. The article argues that the current law
should be reformed, aiming at creating a more inclusive company
where shareholders would actually enjoy a bundle of rights
appropriate for capital providers. The law should also be
reformed so that stakeholders whose interests are integrally
linked with the company’s fortune – such as employees and
creditors – should be factored into the company. This is in the
interests of both the company and the shareholders.
1 THE ENGLISH COMPANY AS A NEXUS
OF CONTRACTS
The theoretical conception behind the English company is the
so-called ‘nexus of contracts’ theory. It is ‘a fact that narrow
contractarian models of the corporation have dominated aca-
demic thinking1 in the UK’. According to the nexus of contracts
theory, the company is simply a private affair between share-
holders. It is simply a nexus of contracts renegotiated by the
individuals involved in it – the shareholders – with the principal
aim of maximizing their own profits and utility2 as well as the
market value of the company through ‘allocative, productive
and dynamic efficiency’.3 The shareholders are the only mem-
bers of the company within this context. Companies are ‘simply
legal fictions which serve as a nexus of contracting relationships
among individuals’4; hence it is an exclusively private affair
devoid of any social considerations. They consist of many ‘dif-
ferent kinds of relations that are worked out by those voluntarily
associating in a company’5 and they form ‘the substance of the
corporate fiduciary duty’.6 Therefore, from its very conception
the founding theory of the English company accepts that the
company as an entity is simply a collection of private contractual
relations. This has been viewed as the founding principle on
which shareholder exclusivity has been based. The theory
defines the company as the outcome of a network of contractual
agreements. The shareholders’ relationship with a company is
deemed to be of a contractual nature as it derives from a
contract: the articles of association. Each company in the UK
has articles which form the constitution of the company.7 The
articles of association constitute a contract not merely between
the shareholders and the company, but between each indi-
vidual shareholder and every other.8 However, other sta-
keholders fit into this model comfortably too. Both
employees and creditors are parties to contractual
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agreements with the company, on the basis of which they
provide their services and capital to the legal person. Since
stakeholders are also parties to contractual agreements with the
company, the recognition of shareholders as the only actors in a
contractual relationship with the company is rather problematic.
The articles of association which form the contract between the
company and the shareholders are a contract of special nature.
They present many particularities that distinguish it clearly from
mainstream contracts such as the contracts signed by employees
and creditors. The latter are covered by employment law and
contract law respectively, which set out a specific set of rights
and obligations flowing from the contracts in question which are
binding on both parties. The relevant functions of the articles of
association which clearly distinguish them from a mainstream
contract are examined next in this article.
The definition of the company as a collection of private
contractual relationships9 is quite consistent with the domi-
nance of individualism within company law. Since, the com-
pany is a collection of contractual relationships which are
exclusively of a private nature, the company is devoid of any
social responsibility. It should be left intact from any regulatory
interference which would place limitations upon the right to
use the free enterprise tool as shaped exclusively by its signatory
parties and owners: the shareholders. However, there lies a
significant contrast at the core of the theory in question. The
company is not a ‘thing’ capable of being owned. It is a nexus
of contracts, ‘written and unwritten, among owners of factors
of production and customers’.10 While the theory provides the
grounds for granting absolute primacy to shareholders as the
exclusive members of the company in the name of liberty,
individualism and lack of state intervention, it regards the
company as a network of interrelated contracts which can
simply not be owned. The latter is viewed like a collection
of interlinked contractual relations which reflect the bargain
between the different contractual parties and their intention to
pursue profitability on a voluntary basis. The recognition of an
owner of the network of interrelated contracts is therefore
rather inconsistent with the very nature of the theory in ques-
tion. Hence, there is a grey area as to the theoretical founda-
tions of the shareholder ownership of the company even in the
core of the theory which has laid the foundations of the English
company. The controversy in question embodies the challen-
ging nature of the task to solidly justify shareholder exclusivity
in either law or theory and demonstrates that the source of the
popularity of the former is mostly detected in ideology.
The company has been deconstructed11 or ‘disaggregated’12
into a ‘number of complex, private consensual transactions or
contract based relations … the parties involved in those con-
tracts … include shareholders, managers, creditors, customers
and employees’.13 It could be subsequently argued that in a
nexus of contracts all constituents who form a party to any
contractual relationship with the company appear to be on an
equal footing.14 Therefore, it is clear that the exceptional status
handed to shareholders in the form of complete supremacy does
not derive from the theory. ‘If the company were owned by the
shareholders, there could not be a nexus of contracts.’15 A nexus
of contracts implies the existence of a network of contractual
relationships on equal footing. Each of the members of the net-
work enjoys a contractual relationship with the legal person. The
recognition of shareholder supremacy within this theoretical con-
struction, let alone of shareholder exclusivity, cannot be viewed as
a by-product of the theory. The article argues that the theory has
been misinterpreted to promote a principle – shareholder supre-
macy – which sits quite uncomfortably within its context.
2 ARE THE ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION A REGULAR
CONTRACT?
The articles of association constitute the contract which binds
the company with its shareholders. The contractual nature of
the articles gives birth to the contractual relationship between
the company and its shareholders. However, in contrast to
mainstream contracts, such as an employment contract or a
loan contract, the articles of association present a set of parti-
cularities which render the inclusion of shareholders within
the list of contractual actors controversial. There is a certain
degree of legal uncertainty which is linked with the question
as to who can enforce the rights stemming from the articles of
association. Astonishingly enough, the shareholders – the sig-
natories of the contract – may be denied the right to invoke
rights stemming from that contract if they hold an additional
capacity. If a shareholder of a company acts as its solicitor or
accountant, for example, his ability to invoke rights stemming
from the articles is anything but guaranteed. The lack of
certainty as to whether the parties to a contract have the
capacity to rely on its provisions is indicative of the set of
challenges that are to be faced when one attempts to view the
relationship between the company and the shareholders as a
contractual one in its traditional sense.
The courts have not been very helpful in providing us with
a clear interpretation of the concepts in question. In London
Sack,16 Scott LJ said that the contract, which was created
between the members under the predecessor to section 33,
did not constitute a contract between them ‘about rights of
action created entirely outside the company relationship such
as trading transactions between members’. Great confusion
was created when, despite what was initially thought, share-
holders could not actually enforce the ‘contract’ when they
held an additional role within the company such as that of a
solicitor or accountant. In such a case, shareholders may find
it difficult to enforce rights stemming from the ‘contract’,
because they are considered ‘outsiders’. The courts refuse to
grant them the rights provided for by the articles even though
they are considered to be a contract. The courts demonstrated
a sense of ambiguity when dealing with this issue which led to
two different lines of cases which represent two different
types of approach in relation to this matter. In Eley,17 the
court held that the articles were a matter between the share-
holders among themselves or the shareholders and the
9 Fama, E., Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Economy
288, 290 (1980).
10 Abugu E.O. Joseph, Primacy of Shareholders’ Interests and the Relevance of
Stakeholder Economic Theories, Co. Law. 210 (2013).
11 Keay Andrew, The Corporate Objective 28 (Edward Elgar 2011).
12 Johnson L., 92 Columbia Law Review 2215, Individual and Collective
Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92, p. 2221 (1992).
13 Andrew, supra n. 11, at 28.
14 Easterbrook F. & Fischel D., Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & Econ.
396 (1983).
15 Eisenberg M., The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts,
and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. Corp. L. 825 (1999).
16 London Sack and Bag v. Dixon [1943] 2 All ER 763.
17 Eley v. Positive Government Security Life Association (1876) 1 Ex D
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company. They did not create any contract between a soli-
citor and the company. This was so even though the solicitor
had become a member of the company sometime after the
articles had been signed.
This means that there is a subtlety in the definition of an
‘outsider’ in these circumstances. He is a person unable to
enforce the articles or be affected by the contract in the
articles. When the person seeking to enforce the articles has
effectively two relationships with the company, he may be
both an ‘outsider’ in the sense discussed in Eley, but at the
same time a shareholder of the company. In this case he might
find it difficult to enforce the articles. In Hickman,18 Astbury
J cited a number of cases and went on to say: ‘An outsider to
whom rights purport to be given by the articles in his capacity
as outsider, whether he is or subsequently becomes a member,
cannot sue on those articles treating them as contracts
between himself and the company to enforce those rights.’
In another line of cases which demonstrated an entirely
different judicial approach on this matter, the court ruled in
Salmon19 that Salmon, who was a managing director, was able
to enforce his right of veto by way of the contract in the
articles. Here the court effectively supported that every share-
holder has the right to enforce the articles of the company; a
shareholder who also holds a position as an outsider (such as
managing director, solicitor, etc.) can, wearing his shareholder
hat, enforce the contract in the articles, even if the direct
result of that enforcement is of benefit to him wearing his
outsider hat. This proves that the definition of the relationship
between the company and the shareholders as contractual
could be a challenging matter. The nature of the contract
binding the company with its shareholders presents certain
particularities which render its inclusion in this nexus of
contracts problematic. And if such a level of uncertainty and
lack of clarity exists at the very foundations of English com-
pany law, it is evident that an equal level of uncertainty will
be met across many of the corporate functions that involve
shaping a balance between shareholders and stakeholders.
The two lines of rulings demonstrate the difficulties
encountered when attempting to treat the articles as a typical
contract within the framework of contract law. In contrast,
the document regulating the internal affairs of the company
and the relationship among its components is distinctive,
giving birth to rights and obligations that are consequently
unique. The agreement upon this principle is instrumental for
an understanding of the position of shareholders within the
English company and within the framework of English com-
pany law.
It is therefore evident that the position of the shareholders
in a company which is defined as a collection of private
contractual relationships raises many important questions
related to its validity. In O’Neil,20 the company was defined
as ‘an association of persons for an economic purpose … the
terms of the association are contained in the articles of asso-
ciation’. Therefore, the company has an economic purpose
which is the by-result of consent among the individuals con-
stituting its composite members.21 By buying shares, one can
therefore become a party to this agreement respecting the
purpose of the association, agreeing to its terms and accepting
its limitations but also taking advantage of the right to parti-
cipate in the majority required to alter the terms of the
agreement. This is integral in the notion of membership,
but whether a contractual nature can be granted to those
rights and obligations is an issue that would require more
solid legal justification.
3 CAN RISK JUSTIFY SHAREHOLDER SUPREMACY
WITHIN A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS?
Shareholder supremacy and exclusivity are justified by the
importance ascribed by contractarian theorists to the status
of the shareholders as the ‘residual-risk’ bearers. The share-
holders are deemed as the ‘residual-risk’ bearers because they
are at the bottom of the list of actors who are to be compen-
sated in case of corporate insolvency. They can retrieve part
of their investment only after the rest of the stakeholders have
been compensated for the losses they suffered due to corpo-
rate insolvency. According to the contractarian theorists,
shareholders are the only group who are granted membership
rights, because they are regarded as the only residual claimant
group within a company.22 It can be argued that this shows an
increased level of risk undertaken by shareholders. But, it can
also be argued that this is clear proof that the various con-
tractual relations which comprise the company are indeed on
an equal footing. When a company becomes insolvent the
creditors and employees are satisfied first on the basis of their
respective contracts. In the most critical moment for the
company the contractual relationship between the company
and its creditors takes precedence over shareholders’ rights.
Even company law recognizes that the claims of the afore-
mentioned stakeholders stemming from their respective con-
tracts should come at the top of the insolvent company’s
agenda. The shareholders are the final actors to be compen-
sated only in cases where this is indeed possible. Company
law therefore recognizes that in the most critical moment for
the company, the claims stemming from these contracts, as
provided for by employment and contract law respectively,
take precedence over the articles of association. It is therefore,
hard to justify shareholder exclusivity on a contractual basis.
The former is based on the fact that the shareholders are
signatory parties to the articles of association. Yet the latter
are set aside when the company is insolvent leaving them at
the back of the queue.
The contractarians are attempting to re-invent the natural
entrepreneurial risk-taking on the part of the shareholders
which naturally stands at the heart of corporate activities as
well as of capitalism itself. Shareholders are however assuming
a calculated risk since they are protected by the principle of
limited liability and they can foresee the risks inherent in
their investment. Their risk-bearing character is so limited
that it cannot justify their treatment as the supreme actors or
the owners of the enterprise by the theory.23 Their listing as
18 Hickman v. Kent and Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders [1915] 1 Ch
881.
19 Quin & Axtens Ltd v. Salmon [1909] AC 442.
20 O’Neil and another v. Phillips (1999)UKHL 24 [1999] 1 WLR 1092.
21 Bolodeoku, O.I., Economic Theories of the Corporation and Corporate
Governance: a Critique, J. Bus. L. 418 (2002).
22 Wen Shuangge, The Magnitude of Shareholder Value as the Overriding
Objective in the UK: The Post Crisis Perspective, 26(7) J. Int’l Banking L. &
Reg. 330 (2011).
23 Abbasi Zubair Muhhamad, Legal Analysis of the Agency Theory: An
Inquiry into the Nature of Corporation, 51(6) Int’l J. L. & Mgmt. 405
(2009).
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the sole bearers of residual risk is inaccurate. Creditors and
employees can face losses which will be much more damaging
to their financial interests or livelihoods respectively.
Shareholders can release themselves from the company at
any moment by liquidating their shares and perhaps retrieving
the entirety of their investment or even making some profit;
this is not the case for the rest of the actors involved in the
company, who have a much higher stake in its survival and
success. Labour is significantly less mobile than capital; geo-
graphy plays a much bigger role in this context. Employees
often have deep and long-lasting personal and family roots
with a particular place where the company is located and
relocation can come at a high economic and personal cost.
This is also the case for suppliers who, depending on their
size, rely on the local market for their existence. Therefore,
the fact that shareholders enjoy exclusivity within the corpo-
rate context is rather a reflection of the United Kingdom’s
prevailing and deeply rooted cultural principles of individu-
alism and laissez-faire capitalism.24 The roots of their status are
mostly ideological.
4 CAN SHAREHOLDERS CLAIM A PROPERTY
RIGHT ON A COMPANY DEFINED AS A NEXUS
OF CONTRACTS?
Theorists of the corporation ‘eschew the concept of cor-
porate ownership in assessing shareholders’ rights and direc-
tors’ obligations in the corporate system’.25 Some argue
that it is ‘anomalous to view the shareholders as corporate
owner’26 as they perceive ‘corporate constituents as factor
providers, whose interests in the corporation are defined
and regulated by contractual negotiations with the
corporation’.27 Therefore, it is logical to question the fun-
damentals of the theory by asking a very basic question: if
the company is simply a nexus of contracts, of what exactly
could the shareholder be the owner.28 The majority of
scholars argue that shareholder supremacy is based on the
existence of a ‘residual claim’ on the part of the share-
holders. More specifically, the private firm is characterized
by the existence of divisible residual claims on the ‘assets
and cash flows of the organisation which can generally be
sold without permission of the other contracting
individuals’.29 Hence shareholders could be viewed as hav-
ing the greatest stake in the outcome of the company30 and
therefore the greatest interest in the right of control above
any other stakeholders.31 The theory in question views the
shareholders as the most appropriate actors to monitor
management as theoretically at least they are the most
motivated actors to do so in order to safeguard their resi-
dual rights. However, it is now accepted that the separation
of ownership and control,32 which took place at least in the
context of the public company, impacted on the capacity
of shareholders to control the company. In most cases the
shareholders are either unwilling to perform such a
demanding role or they simply lack the information to do
so. The legal rules which empower the management with
the right to determine in absolute terms how to utilize and
allocate the assets has an adverse effect on the validity of
any argument that shareholders are the residual claimants.33
Shareholders do not have any ownership claim on the assets
of the company which are owed by the legal person that is
the company. Directors of a company can therefore deter-
mine the management of those assets which may not
involve handouts to shareholders. Shareholders are there-
fore not even entitled to receive dividends. Dividends fall
within the exclusive discretion of the management which
decides whether dividends are to be distributed to share-
holders or not. The resignation of any sense of control over
the corporate assets strips the supporters of shareholder
exclusivity of any strong legal arguments that could justify
this status. This is a status which at theoretical level adheres
to shareholder supremacy while in practice it led to man-
agerial dominance.
Shareholders as residual claimants guarantee performance
of their contracts by investing their money to buy capital
and technology34; therefore they assume a risk as the pro-
viders of the capital but that is distinguished from owner-
ship of the firm itself which is a distinctive legal person. It
is clear that capital and technology are owned by the
company and not by the shareholders. Therefore, a distinc-
tion between the ownership of the shares and the owner-
ship of the firm is clear. It is astonishing that such a
contradiction lies at the foundations of the theory. Fama
claims that ‘as residual claimants the shareholders guarantee
the performance of their contracts by putting up wealth ex
ante with this front money used to purchase capital and
technology that the corporation uses for its productive
activitie’s.35 Therefore, the shareholders bear the residual
risk, but the company itself retains its independence as a
separate legal person. This statement is a necessary pre-
requisite that enables the understanding that the control
over a firm’s decisions is not necessarily within the ability
of the shareholders36 as the ‘ownership of the residual claim
on the corporation’s assets and earnings … is not the same
as ownership of the corporation itself’.37
24 Fisher Deryn, The Enlightened Shareholder – Leaving Stakeholders in the
Dark: Will Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 Make Directors
Consider the Impact of Their Decision on Third Parties?, 20(1) Int’l Co. &
Com. L. Rev. 11 (2009).
25 Bolodeokou Omotayo Ige, Economic Theories of the Corporation and
Corporate Governance: A Critique, 4 (July) J. Bus. L. 411 (2002).
26 Ibid.
27 SeeWilliamson Oliver, Corporate Governance, 93 Yale L. J. 1197 (1984).
28 Clerc Christophe, Questioning the Legitimacy of Shareholder Power, in
Does Company Ownership Matter? 97 (Touffut Jean-Philippe ed.,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2009).
29 Jensen & Meckling, supra n. 4, at 305; Fama, supra n. 9, at 311.
30 Macey, R.J., Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligation to
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84
Cornell L. Rev. 1267 (1999).
31 Van der Weide, M.E., Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders,
21 Del. J. Corp. Law 57 (1996).
32 Berle A. Adolph & Means C. Gardiner, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (2d revised ed., Transaction Publishers 30 Sept. 1991).
33 Yan Min, Agency Theory Re-examined: An Agency Relationship and
Residual Claimant Perspective, 26(4) Int’l Co. and Com. L. Rev. 142
(2015).
34 Fama, supra n. 9, at 290.
35 Ibid., at 288.
36 Ibid.
37 Bainbridge, M.S., The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice
32 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008).
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5 THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN A NEXUS
OF CONTRACTS
The status enjoyed by shareholders in the English company is,
therefore, not a result of an alleged property right over the
corporation which simply no longer exists but a by-product of
the dominant ideology which places individualism in the cen-
tre of corporate formations with a distaste of statist interven-
tions. Such ideology encourages individualism and laissez-faire
principles as ‘corporate property was to be treated as private
property demanding minimum government interference as this
leads to inefficient allocation of capital’.38 Shareholders invest
their capital in the company and they benefit from its long-
term sustainability and profitability. They benefit when reaping
the profits of a company which operates on the basis of a long-
term strategy that guarantees their investment. Their capital is
allocated effectively when it sustains long-term corporate
operations that result in profitability. The managers of a com-
pany which is defined as an exclusively private affair are nowa-
days encouraged to aim at short-term benefits.39 The latter can
be quickly distributed to shareholders and convince them that
the company is managed efficiently. The shareholders will
become restless only in cases where their interests are grossly
neglected. As is explained in the final part of the article, in such
a case they can attempt to resort to the judiciary. The latter will
avoid interfering in corporate affairs unless this is deemed
necessary. So, within the theory short-termism emerges as a
managerial shield against potentially restive shareholders, who
would otherwise remain apathetic. This is because short-ter-
mism conveys an illusion of a well-functioning company. It
encourages further shareholder abstinence from exercising any
control on management. Therefore, directors can exercise
unfettered control on corporate affairs, but it will also impact
on the shaping of a sustainable long-term corporate strategy.
The latter would guarantee more stable prospects for all stake-
holders involved, including the shareholders. It therefore
becomes apparent that the current interpretation of the theory
harms not only stakeholders and the society at large but most
shareholders too.40 This results in ‘undue focus on share price,
which is an unreliable and unpredictable means of assessing a
company’s performance or sustainability’,41 since it is prone not
only to price manipulation but it can also be affected by
external actors unrelated to the company. The price of shares
rises in times of good economic climate or due to the
announcement of a positive economic outlook for the econ-
omy or the sector as a whole. In the Gaiman42 case, the court
clarified that directors should take regard of the interests of
shareholders both present and future. The judgment reveals an
approach which renders short-termism as incompatible with a
genuine interpretation of English company law. English com-
pany law underlines the importance shareholders have within
the corporate context, but it also promotes a directorial beha-
viour which shall aim at serving the interests of the share-
holders who may join the company at a later stage, hence
encouraging the introduction of a long-term corporate agenda
which is at odds with the nexus of contracts theory. Despite
the prominence of the nexus of contracts understanding of the
company in scholarship, there is ‘no single strain of judicial
authority supporting shareholder value and so it is not as legally
embedded as its proponents argue’.43 In Fulham Football Club,44
the court stated that ‘the duties owed by directors are to the
company and the company is more than just the sum total of its
members’. The dominance of the theory in question has
resulted in extensive short-termism in English companies. In
2013 the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards
criticized the pursuing of short-termism in the banking sector
and recommended that company law should be changed to
remove shareholder primacy in respect of banks, and require
directors to ensure the financial safety and soundness of the
company ahead of the interests of its shareholders.45 Theories
that attribute ownership to shareholders are ‘outdated, over-
abstracted, over-static and far removed from the modern busi-
ness environment and social reality’.46 The nexus of contracts
theory is based on ‘the philosophy of laissez-faire which
assumes that the contractual relationship at work between
capital and labour is an equal one, governed by market laws
of demand and supply’.47 However, ‘contractual freedom has
been regulated especially where the bargaining positions are
unequal’.48 Very few will place the importance of shareholders
in doubt, however, their establishment as the only actor with a
‘residual risk’ is based on shaky foundations. Shareholders have
a stronger negotiating position as they can exit the company at
any point by liquidating their stock – even at a loss – should
they decide to do so before insolvency. The other stakeholders
will lack the ability to do that; their bargaining position against
the company is weak as their livelihoods are much more
dependent on the company.
The company has traditionally been viewed as a voluntary
association between private individuals rather than as a crea-
tion of the state.49 Neo-classical economists, including Coase,
have viewed companies as a method of ‘reducing the costs of
a complex market consisting of a series of bargains among
parties’,50 rendering unnecessary further regulation, especially
on the part of the state. The focus is therefore clearly placed
on the contract as the ‘mechanism which brings about
exchange’,51 and the company is viewed as possessing a
38 Kiarie S., At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and
Enlightened Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom
Take?, Int’l Co. & Com. L. Rev. (2006).
39 Rahim Mahmudur Mia, The Rise of Enlightened Shareholder Primacy and
Its Impact on US Corporate Self-Regulation, 25(12) Int’l Co. & Com.
L. Rev. 412 (2014).
40 Stout Lynn, The Shareholder Value Myth 6 (San Francisco: Barrett-
Koehler Publishers Inc 2012).
41 Kiarie, supra n. 38, at 334.
42 Gaiman v. National Association for Mental Health [1970] 2 All E.R., 362,
Ch. D.
43 Keay Andrew, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Lloyd’s Mar. & Com.
L. Q. 341–346 (2006).
44 Fulham Football Club Ltd v. Cabra Estates Plc [1994] 1 BCLC 363 (CA).
45 Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards,
Changing Banking for Good, House of Lords, House of Commons,
2013. See http://www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/
Banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf.
46 Letza Steve, Sun Xiuping & Kirkbride James, Shareholding Versus
Stakeholding: A Critical Review of Corporate Governance 12(3) Corp.
Governance 243 (2004).
47 Yavasi Mahmut, A Socio-legal and Economic Introduction to Corporate
Governance Problems in the EU, 22(6) Com. Law. 163 (2001).
48 Deryn, supra n. 24, at 12.
49 Cheffins R. Brian, Company Law, Theory, Structure and Operation 41
(Clarendon Press 1997).
50 Belcher, A., The Boundaries of the Firm: the Theories of Coase, Knight and
Weitzman, 17 Legal Stud. 22 (1997).
51 Alchian & Demsetz, supra n. 2, at 777.
140 MARIOS KOUTSIAS
central position in ‘the contractual arrangements of all other
inputs’.52 However, even if a purely contractual basis for the
company is accepted, it can be hardly viewed as independent
from its regulatory background. The governance of corpora-
tions is indeed determined not only through contracts but also
through law and societal norms which impact on the nature
of the economic model adopted by each country. The inter-
relationship between these three pillars of corporate govern-
ance is indeed very complex and, as their character is deeply
rooted in the cultural values, dominant in a given society.53 It
has to be noted that although contracts are the outcome of the
agreement between private actors, they cannot be viewed in
isolation from the state and the jurisdiction within which they
operate. The contracts are written under the ‘shadow of the
state’54; therefore laws and societal norms affect the content of
contracts and they determine the nature of corporate law and
corporate governance because they constitute the background
factors that the parties need to take into account when they
negotiate. Neglecting the regulatory, normative and societal
background of the contractual arrangement will not therefore
insulate the company from external influences and interven-
tions. The latter are indeed inherent even in the contractual
agreement which binds its members. Under this theory,
company law should have as its sole objective the maximiza-
tion of shareholder value. To this end it must set default rules
that maximize the efficiency of negotiating the nexus of
contracts. In this way transaction costs can be reduced ‘as
negotiations do not need to take place in every single transac-
tion … the emphasis is on investors’ choices’.55 The corpora-
tion in this framework is to be understood as ‘the product of a
series of organisational innovations that have had the purpose
and effect of economising on transaction costs’.56
The nexus of contracts theory places a focus on the net-
work of contractual relations existing within a company, but
it does not take into consideration and therefore analyse the
different nature of the contracts involved. There are actors
such as the employees and suppliers who sign contracts with
the company, setting the specific legal framework within
which they are going to supply either their personal labour
or specifically defined products and services to the legal per-
son that is the company. Therefore, stakeholders other than
shareholders ‘can have a stake in a portion of a company’s
surplus through their contracts with the company’.57 It is not
clear why, in an entity which is viewed as a network of inter-
connected contracts, supremacy is handed to the contract
between the shareholders and the company. The shareholders
are ‘the only group whose contract with the company is
relational’.58 Other providers of finance or labour have con-
tracts setting in detail how much interest or remuneration
they should be paid. Shareholders have no guaranteed pay-
ments because the directors, as explained above, have absolute
power over the level of dividends paid to shareholders.
Therefore, it is clear that even if there was one shareholder
who held all of the shares of a company ‘he or she would not
truly be the sole residual claimant, for many others’ welfare
would be affected by managers’ decision at least ex post’.59
Hence, the only time when shareholders are literally treated as
residual claimants is when the company is insolvent or
approaching insolvency.60 So, the dominant theory views
the shareholders as the owners who should enjoy absolute
supremacy within the company, but shareholders lack the
ability to control the corporate assets. Unlike ordinary prin-
cipals, shareholders lack the ability to control the board and its
decision-making process in many cases. And unlike residual
claimants, shareholders are neither entitled nor in a position to
demand dividends.61
6 SHAREHOLDERS’ PROTECTION WITHIN
THIS CONTEXT: THE REMEDY OF SECTION
994 CA2006
The position of directors within the English company is
evidently defined by the nature of the agreement on which
the operation of the company is based. Section 17 of the
Companies Act 2006 explicitly refers to the constitution of
the company as the document which comprises the articles of
association, along with any special resolutions that have
altered their provisions in the course of the company’s life
and operation. Section 33 clarifies that the provisions of the
articles bind the company and its members to the same extent
as if there were covenants on the part of the company and of
each member to observe those provisions. The terminology
employed is also of particular importance; the Companies Act
does not make a reference to the ‘shareholders’ at this point.
Instead, the preferred term is ‘members’. This is an expression
of the status of the shareholders as the only constituent mem-
bers of the company. - English company law may accept the
principle of shareholder primacy as one of its pillars and most
distinctive features, but on key issues such as minority protec-
tion it ‘has historically been very shareholder unfriendly’.62 If
shareholder supremacy was based on solid grounds, then
shareholders should have had sufficient protection against
abuse of directorial powers in the shape of effective
remedies.63 Minority shareholders are therefore left with the
choice to found their claims on either section 994 of the
Companies Act 2006 – in case of private companies – when
the company is being run in an ‘unfairly prejudicial manner’
for their own interests, or to raise a so-called derivative action
on the basis of sections 260–263. Common law provided little
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protection to a shareholder who had been treated unfairly but
lawfully by the majority64; this is a principle clearly reflected
at Foss v. Harbottle. The two sets of articles have been applied
and interpreted by the courts in a way that severely limits the
ability of minority shareholders to exercise effective control
on the powers of the management.
7 SECTION 994 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2006
UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT
The exercise of the remedy in question, which is the most
popular form of minority shareholder protection in the UK,
evidently results in the departure of the aggrieved shareholder
from the ineffectively managed company rather than a change
in the quality, style and methods of management that have led
to the company suffering losses. Therefore, the successful
invocation of the remedy of section 994 will result in the
company getting rid of the protesting shareholder rather than
the ineffective director who most likely would have breached
the duty he owed to the company, therefore providing the
grounds for successfully resorting to section 994. The man-
agement can benefit from the aggrieved and protesting share-
holder’s removal from the company, which will effectively
remove a potentially menacing thorn from the directors’ side.
Companies naturally come in all shapes and sizes, from the
publicly listed multinationals to the ‘quasi-partnership’.65
Section 994 is mostly relevant within the context of the latter
as it provides for the ability of a shareholder to be bought out
of the company; in the case of publicly listed companies a
shareholder is in any case in a position to sell his shares to
third parties. Shareholders are viewed as the exclusive mem-
bers of the company. Section 994 is centred on the notion of
‘membership interests’. As it was explained in the article
membership in the English company is a contractual
relationship.66 The latter is at least in theory inclusive of the
legal rights of a shareholder found within the statute as well as
in common law and in the company’s articles of association.67
Political theorists and constitutional lawyers have put in
place mechanisms which promote majority rule while simul-
taneously protecting the rights of minorities which have to
abide by majority rule. This is due to the recognition of the
importance of protecting minorities when dissenting from
majority view. This principle constitutes one of the most
discernible aspects of a democracy. One cannot claim that
the same delicate balance has been achieved at corporate level.
If minority shareholders’ remedies are all about assisting the
shareholders to deal with cases of a breach of directors’ duties
which can lead to potentially significant losses, then the
remedy in question has not only failed to deliver this aim,
but has led to the directors removing an annoying source of
complaints from their agenda. The minority shareholder
might be able to release himself from the company on the
basis of onerous requirements and reinvest elsewhere, but the
company he left behind may sustain a failing system of man-
agement accompanied with an ineffective set of controls and
checks. The practical inability to enforce a strict system of
internal checks on the directors’ actions, even in cases of a
breach of duty, is a feature integral in the function and
application of English company law. While the protection
granted by section 994 is indeed extensive,68 the courts
have severely limited its scope of application. The effective-
ness of section 994 as a means of affording effective minority
protection is dependent upon the discretion of the judges
when dealing with the notions of unfairness and legitimate
expectations.69 And this may lead to a lack of clarity as to the
exact set of rules and criteria to apply in a given case. A purely
contractarian view allows each shareholder to enforce the
shareholders’ agreement or the articles of association in a
way which disregards the interests of other shareholders.
The shareholders are recognized as the exclusive members
and owners of the company, yet not only do they not control
the management but they are not even provided with an
effective range of remedies in case of managerial abuse. In
fact the implementation of the remedy of section 994 by the
courts demonstrates not only a lack of effective control upon
the management of the company but also a clear undermining
of the rights of the shareholders which stem directly from
their shares such as the right to vote. In another
Commonwealth jurisdiction – Hong Kong – in the Luck70
case, the court blocked the shareholders’ right to vote against
a corporate resolution aiming at amending the company’s
articles of association as this was deemed as ‘unfairly prejudi-
cial’ for the affairs of the company.71 This approach seems to
cut through even the absolute essential layers of protection of
shareholders and to deprive them of the fundamental bundle
of rights that flow directly from the ownership of their shares.
It is astonishing that a jurisdiction can claim to have share-
holder supremacy in its contractual core while failing to
enforce even the core of shareholders’ rights. The distance
between theory and practice could not be any more evident.
The right of a shareholder to vote ‘his shares is a right of
property which the shareholder is free to exercise in what he
regards as his own best interest’.72 Yet it seems that these
rights could be set aside under certain circumstances while
using the provisions aiming at shareholder protection. This is
an irony of the law that highlights the necessity to reform the
nexus of contracts theory and its legislative application.
The UK continues to rely heavily on the private enforce-
ment of breaches of the duties and on soft-regulation in the
form of non-binding corporate governance codes which put
in place a set of standards to which directors shall adhere.73
Although it is evident that the market can affect how directors
act, it is necessary to have a means of external discipline such
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as the ability to initiate legal proceedings.74 Therefore, a
laissez-faire approach leads to the undermining of the interests
of the alleged owners of the company which is directly in
contrast with the theory’s basic assumptions. This is made
even more evident by section 239 of CA2006 which allows
shareholders to ratify directorial liability save certain excep-
tions. It is indicative of the lack of willingness on the part of
the legislative and judicial authorities to intervene in corpo-
rate life unless this is rendered imperative. In Re Elgindata,75 it
was stated that a court would normally be hesitant ‘in finding
that a member had a right to expect from directors a reason-
able standard of management… when investing in a company
shareholders take a risk that management may prove not to be
of the highest quality’. The shareholders are claimed to be the
supreme class of actors within the company yet they are
unprotected because that would negate the private character
of the company. This is a serious defect of the theory that not
only comes into conflict with its primary assumptions in
relation to the status of shareholders but it also results in an
admittedly low level of shareholder protection.
8 THE UNFAIR PREJUDICE QUESTION
Sections 994–996 replace sections 459–461 of the Companies
Act 1985, providing a remedy for a member when ‘the
company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a
manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its
members generally or of some part of its members’. The
meaning of unfair prejudice has been described by many
parties as opaque and elusive.76 Consideration was given to
the meaning of unfair prejudice in Re Bovey Hotel Ventures (31
July 1981) unreported, quoted in Re R.A. Noble & Son.77
Slade said: ‘a member of a company will be able to bring
himself within the section if he can show that the value of his
shareholding in the company has been seriously diminished or
at least seriously jeopardised by reason of a course of conduct
on the part of those persons who do have de facto control of
the company, which was unfair to the member concerned’.
He suggested that the test should be an objective one: ‘would
the reasonable bystander observing the consequences of their
conduct … regard it as having unfairly prejudiced the peti-
tioner’s interest?’ This text was adopted by the court in the
R.A. Noble case. In that case a clear distinction was drawn
between the prejudice which was held to have occurred and
the unfair element which was not shown. In Re Macro,78 the
court held that where conduct was unfairly prejudicial to the
financial interests of the company then it would also be
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members. In assessing
the fairness of the conduct the court had to perform a balan-
cing act in weighing the various interests of different groups
within the company. The court did not interfere in questions
of commercial management but where the mismanagement
was sufficiently significant and serious to cause loss to the
company then it could constitute the basis for finding unfair
prejudice. The concept of unfairness is thus capable of being a
very broad one indeed.
The concept of unfair prejudice is larger than the idea of
infringement of legal rights. In Re A Company,79 Hoffman J
said that in a small company ‘the member’s interests as a
member may include a legitimate expectation that he will
continue to be employed as a director and his dismissal from
that office and exclusion from the management of the com-
pany may therefore be unfairly prejudicial to his interests as a
member’. This is of particular interest as the court appeared to
have introduced an additional requirement to the statutory
provision. Whilst section 994 is clear, the courts introduced
the requirement of ‘legitimate expectations’ and therefore
limited its scope of application to a significant extent.
The same view was taken in Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd,80
where the court refused to strike out a petition alleging unfair
prejudice by a failure to declare an adequate dividend. The
court emphasized that ‘interests’ should be considered as
wider than ‘rights’. This seems to slightly deviate from the
contractual nature of the company. The court will look
beyond the contract – the articles of association and focus
upon any fundamental understanding of the parties involved
which may have been breached by managerial conduct. That
means that equitable principles may be introduced in the
courts’ thinking. That may expand shareholders’ protection
but it also creates a grey area which undermines legal cer-
tainty. Despite that, it is evident that a strict contractual
approach may be difficult to define at this stage. The con-
tractual approach in relation to remedies may prove proble-
matic in more than one way. If the unfair prejudice remedy
was based on contract then shareholders may have had the
capacity to contract out of the remedy altogether.81 This is
not possible however as the availability of the remedy is
rendered imperative by law and it does not fall within the
freewill and the contractual willing of the private parties
involved. However, these issues also demonstrate the short-
comings of the contractual theory and the malfunctions of its
application.
It should be noted that this wide view seems to be more
easily adhered to in cases where a small company is involved,
but it has recently been litigated in a number of sporting
contexts. In Re Leeds United Holdings plc,82 the court held
that: ‘The legitimate expectations which the court has to
have regard to under s. 459 (previous numbering of the
current section 994) must relate to the conduct of the com-
pany’s affairs, the most obvious and common example being
an expectation of being allowed to participate in the affairs of
the company.’ However, the court went on to dismiss the
section 459 action in that case because it was based on an
expectation that a particular shareholder would not sell his
shares without the consent of the other shareholders. This was
held not to relate to the company’s affairs and therefore fell
outside section 459.
Therefore, although there have been a considerable
amount of cases concerning the issue of corporate wrongs
litigated in the context of unfair prejudice claims, the
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circumstances in which the court would grant a remedy in an
unfair prejudice claim remain unclear and uncertain. The
difficulties encountered by the courts might seem to suggest
that this is not an issue that should have been left to the
judiciary to interpret and at the end dilute but rather for the
legislator alone so as to achieve clarity and legal certainty.83
Section 994 ‘launches the courts on a discretionary voyage of
discovery as the landmarks of established illegalities are oblit-
erated on a judicial interpretation of what action amounts to
unfair prejudice’.84 But as it is the case when a notion is left to
the discretion of an authority to define, there is always a
question of the elasticity of its judgment criteria as judicial
discretion may be exercised arbitrarily when well-defined
parameters are absent. The problem here is that the concept
of ‘unfair prejudice’ is now a pre-requisite for the application
of section 994 and for the successful granting of the remedy in
question to an aggrieved shareholder. However, the shaping
of an unfair prejudice claim to qualify as a breach of the
agreement made between the shareholders and the company
or the shareholders inter se is constructed in a very broad sense
and includes any understanding held by shareholders whether
or not it is reflected in the articles.85 And that ‘understanding’,
which may not have been included in the formal agreement,
is a fluid notion that can be interpreted and defined by the
court almost on a case by case basis, further blurring the
already difficult to discern boundaries of section 994. The
courts are left with a vast scope of interpretation that leads
to a considerable degree of legal uncertainty as the rules to be
applied are anything but fixed.
9 THE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS QUESTION
In England the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ has
evolved with relatively little ‘judicial consideration being
paid to its rationale during the course of its evolution’.86
The important case of Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc87contains
an extensive analysis of the operation of section 459 (former
section 994) to protect ‘legitimate expectations’.
Hoffman said:
In deciding what is fair or unfair for the purposes of s. 459,
it is important to have in mind that fairness is being used in
the context of a commercial relationship. The articles of
association are just what their name implies: the contractual
terms which govern the relationships of the shareholders
with the company and each other … Since keeping pro-
mises and honouring agreements is probably the most
important element of commercial fairness, the starting
point on any case under s. 459 will be to ask whether the
conduct of which the shareholder complains was in accor-
dance with the articles of association
The term ‘unfairly prejudicial’ was found as equivalent to the
understanding of ‘oppression’ in Elder v. Elder and Watson88:
‘A visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a
violation of the conditions of fair play on which every share-
holder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to
rely.’ The courts therefore are eager to look beyond and
outside the actual contract – in the form of the articles of
association – and to recognize an expectation, such as the
expectation to participate in the management. Therefore, the
courts have attached a requirement in granting the remedy to
the shareholders and that is a vague expectation to participate
in the management on the part of the aggrieved shareholder.
This has further inhibited the shareholders in their attempt to
resort to this remedy.89 Directly or indirectly the concept in
question is defined by reference to the parties’ ex ante under-
standings and expectations; therefore the extent and the nat-
ure of the expectations and intentions of a variety of corporate
actors form part of hypothetical assumptions. This means that
section 994 gives effect to a hypothetical bargain characterized
by a high level of generality.90 It is only natural that at this
stage generality is accompanied by uncertainty too as there is
no pattern against which the legitimate expectations can be
measured or assessed. At this point it is important to distin-
guish a shareholder’s claim of legitimate expectations which
deserve legal protection from others which do not; it is in this
context that the scope of a court’s power to grant the protec-
tion of section 994 is extremely wide.91 It ‘enables judicial
interference in private bargains resulting in the imposition of
judicial notion of fairness’.92 That judicial attitude however
reveals yet another flaw of the contractual theory in the
context of which the contractual nature of the company
should be adhered to. If the contractual nature of the com-
pany was to be literally or rightfully implemented, then pri-
vate individuals should have been left to pursue their own
choices and the ‘invisible hand’ of the market should have
been left to operate with as little governmental interference as
possible. It is an integral part of the contractual theory that
state interference in corporate affairs is undesirable and in a
way unnatural as it is distortive of the market in which
voluntary exchange takes place.93 Therefore, it appears that
this judicial approach may come into conflict with the prin-
ciples which stand at the foundations of English company law.
It serves as a proof of the fact that the contractual theory
appears to be dogmatically accepted by the legislature, acade-
mia and the courts, but its basic principles are set aside by
both the judiciary and the modern corporate realities.
The question in relation to who has a legitimate expecta-
tion to participate in the management of the company is one
which cannot be answered with any degree of certainty. The
only shareholders who can clearly fulfil this requirement are
the ones who had previously been directors of the company;
despite their removal from the board they can claim that since
they were previously a part of the management they still have
a legitimate claim to continue as a part of it. There is an
element of injustice in this, as directors may have been
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removed from the board due to a breach of duty, but if they
hold shares in the company, they are recognized as having
fulfilled one of the basic requirements set by the courts which
will allow them to trigger section 994 successfully. There
have been no clearly defined guidelines by the court as to
who can claim such an expectation. And since the latter form
a requirement for the section 994 remedy to be granted it is
obvious that the application of the latter is based on obscure
terms. Companies therefore are affected by the uncertainty
arising from a section 994 action as the section has to be ‘all
things to all people’.94 That is further supported by the view
that in listed companies the court’s approach will usually be
that ‘legitimate expectations of members are limited to com-
pliance with the memorandum and the articles’,95 therefore
they are strictly linked to the contractual agreement and its
breach while not going above the contractual text. In Blue
Arrow,96 the courts were clearly unwilling to recognize any
legitimate expectations beyond the constitution. The court
stated that ‘this is a public company, a listed company, and a
large one and that the constitution was adopted at the time
when the company was first floated on the Unlisted Securities
Market. Outside investors were entitled to assume that the
whole of the constitution was contained in the articles, read,
of course, together with the Companies Acts. There is in
these circumstances no room for any legitimate expectation
founded on some agreement or arrangement made between
the directors and kept up their sleeves and not disclosed to
those placing the shares with the public.’97 Therefore in
public companies the scope for manoeuvre is even slimmer.
It is astonishing that despite all these deficiencies, which are
integral in the implementation of section 994, the relevant
remedy is still the principal of the remedies available to
protect minority shareholders from oppression.98
O’Neill and Another v. Phillips99 was the first case concern-
ing section 459 to come before the House of Lords.
Therefore, the terms ‘unfair’ and ‘prejudice’ have been
defined in such a wide and general manner that the circum-
stances in which they can be applied cannot be delineated
exhaustively.100 The size of litigation caused concern as to a
potential flood of cases101 and O’Neill responded by adopting
a narrower interpretation of ‘unfair prejudice’. While one
may assume that this would have enhanced legal clarity, it
actually led to further narrowing down the ambit of section
994 by adding requirements to its application which go
beyond the statutory text. Thus, the judicial approach to
unfair prejudice in the UK has undergone what has been
described as a ‘conservative revisionism’102 as the manner in
which unfairness was constructed (in O’Neill) might lead to
cases of injustice. In addition to that, the existing case law on
this matter demonstrates that the court’s approach to assessing
the existence of unfairly prejudicial conduct is a result of their
jurisdiction under section 994 ‘which has an elastic quality
which enables the courts to mould the concepts of unfair
prejudice according to the circumstances of the case,’103
with an obvious impact on legal certainty. Lord Hoffman
held that the existence of a quasi-partnership did not, of itself,
give a right to a member to have his shares purchased; ‘fair-
ness’ usually required some breach of the terms on which the
member had agreed that the affairs of the company should be
conducted. Section 459 had a very clear function and that was
to protect shareholders against a breach of terms on which
they had initially joined the company or from inequity in the
sense noted by O’Neill. While that may seem to be bringing
the focus back to a contractual approach, Lord Hoffman
recognized that there may be cases where terms may be
implied into an agreement and form part of the parties’
wider understanding. That means that at least hypothetically
there may be a conflict between the parties’ understanding
and expectations flowing from the contract and its express
terms. This would be inconsistent with conventional contract
law and underlines the difficulty to apply such an approach in
company law. But there is an additional issue that needs to be
taken into account as it sheds light on the malfunction of the
contractual approach on shareholders’ remedies. It is quite
possible that there is a case of a breach of an expressed
provision of the articles – an express term of a contract – yet
the term in question is of a questionable validity104 as it comes
into contrast with the Companies Act 2006. For example
there is a provision enshrined in the articles which renders a
director irremovable from the board unless a special resolu-
tion is passed by the general meeting. Therefore, it would be
quite controversial to argue whether the infringement of such
a provision would constitute a breach of contract that could
trigger section 994. In addition to that, in cases of breach of
contract usually the aggrieved party is granted damages; in this
case however the courts may prevent the aggrieved party
from pursuing his claim even if an expressed term of the
contract is breached. That reveals a fallacy of the contractual
approach that highlights the problems inherent in the con-
tractual understanding of the company.
10 CONCLUSION
The article challenged the dominant view in both academia
and practice that the principles of absolute shareholder
supremacy and exclusivity are solidly founded upon theory
and law. It argued that the edifice of shareholder supremacy
is based on shaky theoretical foundations and it should be
reformed. Its reform is necessary because modern corporate
reality has rendered the dominant theory obsolete. In prac-
tice shareholder supremacy has given its place to managerial
dominance; the latter has shifted the focus of the company to
short-term goals which are not only detrimental for the
company as a whole but also for the shareholders more
specifically. The dominant theory has therefore created a
set of contradictive principles; it supports the ownership of
the company by the shareholders yet it denied to the share-
holders the rights normally granted not just to owners but
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also to the providers of capital. And while the courts are in
principle fervent supporters of shareholder supremacy, the
case law on shareholders’ remedies has effectively curtailed
shareholders’ rights to an unacceptable degree. It is therefore
evident that shareholder supremacy is nowadays purely ideo-
logical; a degree of dogmatic adherence to ideologies which
were rendered obsolete by reality created a problematic
situation within company law which has the company and
its shareholders as one of the main victims. Legislators should
set aside any ideological dogmatism and reform the law so as
to address these issues and prepare the company to adjust to
the realities and the challenges of the twenty-first century
while playing its societal role effectively. Section 172 of the
2006 Act was certainly not an effective step towards this
direction. Section 172 includes a list of stakeholders whose
interests have to be taken into account when the directors
are exercising their duty to promote the success of the
company. The reality is that nothing changed in relation to
the composition of the corporation in the UK context. The
fact that for the first time a variety of actors were included in
the section which appears to be the legislative cornerstone of
directors’ duties in the UK led to discussions of a shift in the
relevant landscape, bringing the country closer to a German-
style stakeholder model where shareholder primacy is gra-
dually set aside to establish a model where all the relevant
actors find their place in the governance structure of the
British company. The UK did not adopt a more pluralist
stakeholder-orientated approach. Quite in contrast to that,
section 172 reconfirmed the principle of shareholder supre-
macy. The shareholders retained their status as the exclusive
members of the company. In addition to that, the duty of
directors to have regard to the interests of other stakeholders
is still owed to the company and only to it. The interests of
stakeholders can be taken into account in so far as they are
deemed compatible with the interests of the company. If the
duty imposed by section 172 is breached, it is again for the
company – and not for the stakeholders included in the
relevant list – to act. Therefore, the only appropriate litigants
are still the shareholders but in practice – as it was thor-
oughly explained in the article – even they face paramount
obstacles in holding the management to account. Especially
a minority shareholder is left with a minimal and quite
restrictive set of choices when aiming at monitoring the
management. Therefore, we ended up with a company
where the stakeholders are excluded from it and the share-
holders while nominally and theoretically dominant in rea-
lity face many challenges in their attempt to hold the
management to account. Section 172 does not challenge
the regime of directorial dominance. It creates a company
where stakeholders are external and shareholders albeit
supreme are not in a position to exercise the rights stemming
from their shares. The law should be reformed to deal with
this anomaly. Shareholders should be in a position to exer-
cise the full range of rights stemming from their shares,
including the effective monitoring of management, and sta-
keholders should be brought within the corporate context.
Ideological dogmatism should be set aside for the sake of the
protection of the rights of shareholders and stakeholders
alike. In an era of globalization and increased corporate
presence this is a goal that needs to be achieved.
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